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Copyrightability of Video Games:
Stern and Atari
INTRODUCTION

The protection afforded artists and inventors under the 1909
Copyright Act' was inadequate almost from the Act's inception.
The 1909 Act protected only those forms of expression or media
already existing at the time of and explicitly outlined in the Act.
As a result, new and developing modes of expression not provided for in the Act went largely unprotected. 2 Amendments to
the 1909 Act 3 and several state statutes 4 were eventually adopted
to supplement the existing federal protection. Although Congress
recognized early that the 1909 Act could not keep pace with
technological growth, it was not until the enactment of the 1976
Copyright Act (the 1976 Act)5 that the law was revised to protect
6
more modern media and developing artistic expressions.
1. Ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5659, 5660.
3. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (which amended the 1909 Copyright
Act to provide a limited protection for sound recordings).
4. In California, for example, a statute which addressed the pirating of sound recordings was held not preempted by federal law. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
The Court in Goldstein found that the state was exercising a power reserved to it by the
Constitution. Id. at 559-60.
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
6. The language of the Act has not escaped criticism, however. The 1976 Copyright
Act protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed ..
" Id. § 102(a) (emphasis added). The legislative history
indicates Congress' intention to enact a sufficiently flexible statute which would protect
technological advancements in artistic media.
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is
impossible to foresee the forms that these expressive methods will take. The bill
does not intend either to freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at the
present stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited expansion
into areas completely outside the present congressiona! intent. Section 102
implies neither that the subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of
expression within that general area of subject matter would necessarily be
unprotected.
H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5664. See also Brennan, Some Observations on the Revision of the Copyright
Law from the Legislative Point of View, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOCY 151 (1977) (questions
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When enacting legislation governing the issuance of copyrights, Congress must adhere to the economic philosophy embodied in the Constitution. The copyright grant in the Constitution is founded on the premise that the public's interest in the
advancement of and access to the sciences and arts is best

whether the 1976 Act will be any more immune to techological change than the 1909
Act); Katz, A General Revision of the Copyright Law-From Bare Bones to CorpulenceA PartialOverview, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 213, 214 (1977) ("a partial overview of the new
law,.., demonstrates that it raises perhaps as many problems as it solves, and may very
well not have the promised flexibility, nor solve the problems which gave rise to its
enactment in the first place."); Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision,
24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 951 (1977) (concludes that further revisions may be necessary to
create sufficient flexibility in the 1976 Copyright Act to handle changing technology).
Critics have also alleged that the flexibility of the Act may lead to confusion regarding
the scope of subject matter intended to be protected by the Act. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03(A) (1982) ("... if 'works of authorship' are neither so broad
as to encompass all constitutional 'writings,' nor so narrow as to be confined to the seven
broad categories enumerated in Section 102(a), how is one to delineate the scope of such
works?"); Patterson, An Analysis of the 1976 Copyright Act, 3 ALI-ABA COURSE MATERIALS J. 21, 35 (1978) ("No copyright statute in history has provided the courts with as
great an opportunity for creative interpretation as the Act does. What the courts will do,
of course, depends upon too many variables to hazard a guess.").
The legislative activity which led to the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act has been
called "one of the most laborious and painstaking legislative projects ever undertaken in
the Congress." Lehman, Legislative Background, 25 BuL.. COPYRIGHT SoLPY, 192, 193
(1978). The first attempts to revise the 1909 Act can be traced to 1922. Between 1922 and
1940, several general revisions of the 1909 Act were introduced in Congress. The failure of
these efforts was due largely to the controversy regarding the differences between the
Berne Convention on copyrights, a multi-national agreement governing the grant and
effect of copyrights, and U.S. law. H.R. R:P. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CoIDE CONG. & Au). N:ws 5659, 5660. In 1955, Congress authorized the Copyright Office to conduct a three-year study to determine the areas of the copyright law
needing revision. In the following years the Copyright Office made further studies and
requested input from various private interest groups. These activities led to the introduction in 1964 of a draft revision of the Act in both the House and Senate. Neither House
took action on this bill. Before the 89th Congress convened, the Copyright Office revised
its draft bill. In 1965, this revised bill was introduced in both Houses. Hearings were
conducted in both the Senate and House in 1965 and 1966, but the 89th Congress
adjourned before a vote could be taken. In 1967, the House passed a bill to revise the 1909
Act. Due to the extensive controversy over the cable television provision of the bill as
as passed by the House, the bill did not come up for a vote in the Senate. In the following
session of Congress, the 91st, no substantive action regarding copyright legislation was
taken. The 92d Congress delayed action on the revision of the Copyright Act pending the
Federal Communications Commission's adoption of rules regulating the cable television
industry. Recognizing, however, the need to act immediately to combat the widespread growth of the pirating of sound recordings, Congress amended the 1909 Act to
create a limited copyright in sound recordings. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). The
Senate passed a complete revision of the Copyright Act during the 93d Congress. Because
insufficient time remained for the House to consider this complete revision of the Act,
Congress again amended the 1909 Act. The Senate's amendments included an extension
of the renewal term for copyrights due to expire, the permanent establishment of a copy-
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served by granting inventors and artists a monopoly for a
limited period. 7 Such a limited monopoly permits the inventors
and artists to control the exploitation of their work., The inability of the 1909 Act to protect new forms of artistic expression
jeopardized this constitutional objective. Without the assurance
that their efforts would be rewarded by a grant of governmental
protection, artists would lack the incentive to develop new media
or to experiment with new types of expression. In drafting the
1976 Act, therefore, Congress sought to avoid language that
would limit the scope of copyright protection to the then-existing
media.9
In two recent decisions, both the Second and Seventh Circuits
have ruled on the copyrightability of a medium of artistic expression not specifically provided for in the 1976 Act. In both Stern
Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman"' and Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronic Corp.," owners of copyrights
for electronic video games sought to enforce their rights against
alleged infringers.12 At issue in these cases was whether video

right for sound recordings and the creation of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works. In 1976, Congress finally enacted a revision of the
Copyright Act in both Houses. The Senate passed the bill by a unanimous vote in February, 1976. An amended version passed the House on September 22, 1976. The Conference
Committee Report was approved by both Houses on September 30, 1976. On October 19,
1976, President Ford signed the bill into law. See H.R. RP.No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
47-49, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 5659, 5659-62; Lehman, supra; Marke.
United States Copyright Revision and Its Legislative History, 70 L. LIB. J. 121 (1977).
7. "The Congress shall have power ... to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See infra note 43.
8. The constitutional grant has been recognized to be "a limitation, as well as a grant,
of power." Patterson, supra note 6, at 29. Congress is limited because it can grant copyrights only to authors of writings. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (Douglas,
J., concurring); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 1.06 [A]. See also infra notes 18, 25. See
generally Lindenberg-Woods, The Smoking Revolver: Criminal Copyright Infringement,
27 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOcY 63 (1979).

9. See supra note 6.
10. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
11. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
12. In the Stern and Atari cases, the defendants were producing games which the
plaintiffs alleged were substantially similar to their copyrighted games. In Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. 11. 1982), the defendants were producing
speed-up kits which the plaintiffs alleged constituted a violation of their cojpyrights. The
kits altered the play of the plaintiffs' games, making play more difficult by speeding up
the action and shortening the play of the games. Id at 1004. The kits were designed to be
connected to the memory boards of the plaintiffs' games. The district court held that it
was likely the plaintiff would succeed in a case of copyright infringement on the merits
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games are copyrightable under the 1976 Act, and if so, the proper
13
scope of such protection.
This article will review briefly the statutory requirements for
copyright protection and the role of the courts in determining the
scope of such protection. The decisions of the Second and Seventh Circuits will then be discussed and analyzed. Finally, this
article will suggest that the 1976 Copyright Act is sufficiently
flexible to protect video games as well as other new technologies,
and that by so holding, the Second and Seventh Circuits furthered the economic philosophy embodied in the Constitution's
copyright clause.
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act outlines in general terms
the subject matter eligible for copyright protection. 1 4 In order to
qualify for such protection, a work must be original, fixed in a
5
tangible medium, and more than a mere idea.1
Originality
Section 102(a) authorizes the grant of a copyright only to original works. 16 This requirement of originality is mandated by the
constitutional provision authorizing Congress to issue copyrights

and thus entered a preliminary injunction against further sale or production of speed-up
kits by the defendants. Id. at 1014.
13. Atari, 672 F.2d at 614-15; Stern, 669 F.2d at 855.
14. Subject matter of copyright: In general
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
15. Id.
16. Id.

19831

Copyrightability of Video Games

to authors. 17 Though courts have interpreted the term "author"
to mean the originator of any work, including works of science,' 8
Congress may not authorize the grant of a copyright to one who
merely copies a prior-existing work. 1'9 Originality under the 1976
Act is not satisfied, however, solely with the determination that
one is an author and not a mere copier.
Although the 1976 Copyright Act does not define originality,
the legislative history indicates Congress' intent that the courts
continue to follow the standard of originality developed by the
federal courts under the 1909 Act. 20 Under this standard, if a
21
work is the product of an artist's individual efforts, it is original;
one need not prove that it is either novel or unique. 22 Further, it

17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 1.06[A].
18. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,51-58 (1883), the Supreme
Court determined that the drafters of the Constitution intended the term "author" to have
a more expansive definition than simply one who wrote books. "An author in that sense
is 'he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of
science or literature'...." Id. at 57-58. See also 1 M. NIMMER. supra note 6, § 1.06[A].
19. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 1.06[A].
20. "The phrase 'original works of authorship,' which is purposely left undefined, is
intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the
courts under the present copyright statute." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664.

21. See M.M. Business Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137 (6th Cir. 1973), in
which the court's holding was mandated by the originality requirement. The plaintiffs
forms were denied copyright protection because they were merely a "mosaic of the language appearing on other existing forms already in the public domain ..
" Id. at 1139.
For other cases employing the court-developed standard of originality, see Gelles-Widmer
Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Dorsey v. Old Sur. Life Ins.
Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (2d Cir. 1924);
Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 505 F.2d 1250
(7th Cir. 1974); Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Abli, Inc. v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 323 F. Supp. 1400 (C.D. Cal.
1970); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc. 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d
251 (9th Cir. 1962); Smith v. George E. Muehlebach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp. 729 (W.D.
Mo. 1956); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936).
22. In Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir.), afrd, 347 U.S. 201, reh'g denied, 347 U.S.
949 (1954), the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's finding that plaintiffs' copyright registrations for statuettes of male and female dancers was valid. Plaintiffs' copyright was valid because the works owed their origin to the author, not because the subject
matter itself was novel. 347 U.S. at 214 (affirming 204 F.2d at 474). In Wihtol v. Wells, 231
F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956), the court upheld the validity of plaintiffs copyright for a musical
composition, even though the defendant contended that the tune came from a folksong in
the public domain. The court held the work originated with plaintiff when "he devised a
calculated melody score thus putting it in shape for all to read." Id. at 554.
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is generally recognized that this originality standard prohibits
23
little more than actual copying.
Such a standard balances the competing, constitutionally protected interests of the individual artist and the public. While not
requiring novelty or invention, it will not protect works which
are no more than trivial variations of prior-existing creations. At
the same time, because the standard of originality is minimal,
most artistic and inventive efforts will qualify for protection
under the 1976 Act. Thus, the incentive to experiment with and
to develop new works will be kindled, and the public interest in
the advancement of arts and sciences will be served accordingly.

For further references to the originality standard, see also Franklin Mint Corp. v.
National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 880 (1978); L.
Batlin & Sons, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976);
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970); Donald v. Zack
Meyer's T.V. Sales and Serv., 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971); Best Medium Publishing Co. v. National Insider, Inc., 385 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955, reh g denied, 390 U.S. 1008 (1968); Ricker v. General Elec. Co.,
162 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1947); Dorsey v. Old Sur. Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1938);
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 669
(1936); Covington Fabrics Corp. v. Artel Prod., Inc., 328 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Trebonik v. Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Pantone, Inc. v.
A.I. Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph
Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Sutton, 282 F. Supp. 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp.
940 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962); Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 733 (S.D. Cal. 1959), rev'd on othergrounds, 287 F.2d 478 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 801 (1961); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Arcadia Co., 173 F. Supp.
292 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960); Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Palmer Jewelry
Mfg. Co., 171 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co.,
134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Silvers v. Russell, 113 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
As noted in the House Report: "This standard does not include requirements of novelty,
ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright
protection to require them." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprintedin 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664.

The Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), suggested that this
articulation of the standard of originality which the courts have long followed and which
Congress recently adopted, was incorrect. The Court stated that the mandate of art. I, § 8
of the Constitution to "promote the progress of science and useful arts" establishes a
standard of innovation. Id. at 5-6. Even though the Graham decision was addressing the
issue of the appropriate standard for patentability, Nimmer states that it is
"arguable that the standard of novelty is constitutionally required under the federal
copyright laws" by this statement of the Supreme Court in Graham. 1 M. NIMMER, supra
note 6, § 2.01[A] n.10. However, as Nimmer concludes, it is unlikely that the courts will
impose a novelty requirement. Id. It is also unlikely that the Constitution requires
novelty for the issuance of a copyright because of the recognized difference between patents and copyrights. For a good discussion of the constitutional requirements for copyright grants, see Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 101-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
23. See, e.g., Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.), cert.
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Fixation in a Tangible Medium

Section 102(a) also provides that only works fixed in a tangible
medium of expression are copyrightable.2 4 The fixation requirement derives from the constitutional limitation under which
Congress may grant copyrights only to works that qualify as
writings.2 5 The use of the term 'writings' in the Constitution
implies that Congress may grant copyrights to tangible works of
art but not to works that are transitory, that is, of only momentary duration.2 6 Thus, early cases held that a copyrighted work
was not infringed when a copy of it was made if the copy could
not be seen or read without the aid of a machine or device. 27 The
28
1976 Act, however, specifically rejects these holdings.

denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1951).
As noted in Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 347 U.S. 201, reh'g denied, 347
U.S. 949 (1954), the lack of a novelty requirement for copyright means that the scope of
protection it affords is limited. 204 F.2d at 474. If a work originates with the author, it is
protectible even if it is identical to a prior-existing copyrighted work. The owner of that
copyright has no cause of action against the later author who independently creates his
work. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951); Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936), aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
24. For the text of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), see supra note 14.
25. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315, 320 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967), in which the court noted: "the constitutional clause extends
to any concrete, describable manifestation of intellectual creation; and to the extent that
a creation may be ineffable, we think it ineligible for protection against copying simpliciter under either state or federal law." See also 1 M. NIMMER. supra note 6, § 1.08[CI[2].
26. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 1.08[C[21.
27. In White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), the Supreme Court
denied the holder of a copyright for sheet music protection against the unauthorized production of piano rolls for the songs covered by sheet music copyrights. The Court held
that these rolls were not copies within the meaning of the Copyright Act because the
musical work could not be read without the aid of a machine. Id. at 18. Therefore, the
production of the piano rolls was not an infringement of the copyrights plaintiff had
received for the sheet music. Id.
28. The 1976 Act defines fixation as follows:
A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of
this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its
transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In the legislative history, it is noted that: "This
[§ 101] broad language is intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1908), under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend
upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
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Under the 1976 Act, a work, and copies of the work, may be
fixed in any medium so long as they can be perceived for more
than a transitory period of time. 29 Further, the Act expressly
protects works fixed in media which require a machine or device
to aid perception. 30 It is important to distinguish, however, the
original work of authorship from the various copies in which it
may be fixed. An original work of authorship is the product of
the artist's individual efforts; 31 a copy is the material object in
32
which the work is fixed and from which it can be communicated.
To be eligible for copyright protection an original.work must be
fixed in a copy. 33 There is no limitation, under the Act, on the
number of copies or the different types of media that an author
3
may choose for presenting his work to the public. 1
The 1976 Act also grants exclusively to the author of the work
the rights to reproduce or to authorize the reproduction of copies
of his work, to prepare derivative works, and to distribute copies
to the public. 35 Thus, any unauthorized copying of the original
work infringes on the copyright. These rights ensure that the

Sess. 52, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665. See also 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 6, § 2.03[B1].
29. Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of
fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or
any other graphics or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical
object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or
any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by
means of any machine or device 'now known or later developed.'
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5665.
30. Id. See also supra notes 14, 28.
31. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
32. The 1976 Act defines copies and distinguishes them from the work itself.
'Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. The term 'copies' includes the material object, other
than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
53, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5666: "The definitions of these
terms ... reflect a fundamental distinction between the 'original work'... and the multitude of material objects in which it can be embodied."
33. See supra notes 14, 28.
34. See supra note 32.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Act also grants to the owner of a
copyright the exclusive rights:
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
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author will be able to control fully the financial exploitation of
his work and thus be the prime beneficiary of his own effort.3 6
An Idea Is Not Copyrightable
Section 102(b) of the 1976 Act codifies the axiom of copyright
law that copyright protection extends only to the particular
expression of an idea and not to the idea itself.3 7 Accordingly,
the courts will not protect those elements of a work that represent merely an idea. :' The concept of originality, as developed
by the courts, is closely related to this principle.19 Since an idea
is within the public domain, anyone is free to use it in developing
a new work. 40 The resulting new work may be copyrightable
even if the idea is not new and has in fact been incorporated into
copyrighted works by others. 4' As previously noted, novelty of
idea is not a requirement for copyright protection. 42
The constitutional economic philosophy underlying copyright
grants is also related to this concept.4" One is permitted a

(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovidual work to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
36. The Act provides: "(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner as provided by section 106 ... , or who imports copies or phonorecords
into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright." Id.
§ 501(a). Because the author has a cause of action against anyone interfering with any of
the exclusive rights granted under the Act, the author can therefore control the exploitation of his work.
37. Id. § 102(b).
38. See, e.g., Welles v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 308 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1962);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902
(1931); Dollcraft Indus., Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D.N.Y.
1978); Uneeda Doll Co. v. P & M Doll Co., 241 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 353 F.2d
788 (2d Cir. 1965); Taylor v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156 (S.D. Cal.
1953).
39. See supranote 22.
40. For the text of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), see supra note 14. See also Taylor v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D. Cal. 1953), wherein the court noted
that ".. . ideas are not protectible but are as free as the air, to be used by anyone who so
desires."
41. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
42. Id.
43. The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authois and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
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monopoly for "writings and discoveries" 44 but no one is permitted to monopolize an idea. Nevertheless, most individual expressions of the idea will be protected.4 5 The drafters of the Constitution envisioned that such a balance would encourage the growth
of technology. 46 Drawing the line between what is idea and
what is copyrightable expression, however, has not proved easy.
In litigation, parties often contend that they copied merely the
idea and not the copyrighted expression of that idea, leaving the
courts to determine what elements of a work are copyrightable
and what elements constitute the underlying idea.4 7 Unlike the
patent law, the copyright statute does not place the burden on
authors to identify explicitly which parts of their work they deem
4
copyrightable when registering it.8
The abstractions test, suggested by Judge Learned Hand, is
one approach courts have used to determine whether the expression protected by copyright has been infringed. 49 Under this
approach, the courts analyze a work by using progressively
greater generalizations to describe that work. 50 In effect, the
courts draw a line; they deny protection to those abstractions
that are so broad and are applicable to so many works as to be
only ideas, and they grant protection only to those elements that
are sufficiently concrete or particular to a work as to be the
51
author's own artistic representation of an idea.

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
45. See supra note 22.
46. See supra note 43.
47. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960) ("Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond
copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably
be ad hoc.").
48. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). See also E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
COMPETITIVE PROCESS 665-66 (2d ed. 1979).

49. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 402 (1931). See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 615-16 (1982). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A]I1].
50. Upon any work.., a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit
equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out ...[T]here is a point in
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise
the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix
that boundary, and nobody ever can ...
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d at 121.
51. Id. But note that the line is drawn by the courts on a case by case basis, since it is
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Some works embody a great deal of artistry. They build upon
relatively basic ideas and bring to those ideas individual creativity that is entitled to protection. Such works receive a great deal
of protection, and any work substantially similar to the many
elements entitled to copyright protection will be held to infringe
the copyright. 52 In other works, however, the idea is indistinguishable from its expression. These works can only be expressed in a
limited number of ways. Thus, the holder of a copyright for such
works is entitled to very limited protection under the 1976 Act.
Only an exact duplication will be prohibited.53 This is because
works which only vary slightly from the copyrighted work are
merely legitimate attempts by authors to use the same idea the
copyright owner used. 5 4 Other authors are entitled to use the
55
idea, but are necessarily limited in the way it can be expressed.
In sum, ownership of a copyright says very little about the
amount of protection an owner can expect. Each work will be
reviewed to see where along the spectrum between "actual expression" and "mere idea" the various elements of that work fall. In
addition, some elements of a work may be accorded greater protection than other elements. Thus, in an infringement suit, the
defendant may contend that the entire work was not copyrightable or may assert that the copyright does not protect those elements which are similar to the defendant's work. The Second
and Seventh Circuits have recently addressed the questions of
copyrightability and the scope of copyright protection.
THE DECISIONS OF THE SECOND AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS

Stern Electronics v. Kaufman
In Stern Electronics v. Kaufman, 56 Konami, a Japanese corporation, received from the United States Copyright Office a registration for the video game sold under the trademark SCRAM-

not possible to fix a standard applicable to all fact situations.
52. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1971); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Quaker Fabric Corp., 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Generation Mills, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
53. See cases cited supra note 52. See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A[1].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 532 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Konami deposited a tape of the game in the Copyright

Office and registered the game as an audiovisual work.58 Konami then granted an exclusive license to sell the game in North
America to Universe Affiliated International, Inc., which simul59
taneously granted an exclusive sub-license to Stern Electronics.
These license agreements were also recorded in the Copyright
Office. 60 In April of 1981, Omni Video Games began selling a
video game which it called SCRAMBLE 2.61 Stern brought suit
alleging that SCRAMBLE 2 was substantially similar to its own
game, and therefore infringed Stern's copyright. Stern also moved
62
for a preliminary injunction.
In a copyright infringement action, the plaintiff has the burden
of proving that it holds a valid copyright for its work and that
the defendant wrongfully copied that work.63 A certificate of registration issued by the Copyright Office creates the presumption
that the plaintiffs copyright is valid.6 4 If the works at issue in
65
the suit are substantially similar, infringement will be found.
The defendant can rebut this presumption, however, by proving

57. 669 F.2d at 854.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irvin J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1970); Stuff v. E.C. Publications, Inc. 342 F.2d 143 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 822 (1965).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1982) provides: "In any judicial proceedings the
certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the
work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts
stated in the certificate."
At H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 157, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
Aj) NEws 5659, 5773, the drafters of the Act stated:
The principle that a certificate represents prima facie evidence of copyright
validity has been established in a long line of court decisions and is a sound
one .... [E]ndowing a copyright claimant who has obtained a certificate with a
rebuttable presumption of the validity of the copyright does not deprive the
defendant in an infringement suit of any rights; it merely orders the burdens of
proof.
For cases holding that the registration certificate is prima facie evidence of ownership,
see American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978); Nutt v.
National Inst. Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929); GerlachBarklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927); Dollcraft Indus., Ltd. v.
Well-Made Toy Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra
note 6, § 13.011A].
65. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1981); Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979).
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that the copyright at issue is invalid. 66
The defendant in Stern argued against issuance of the preliminary injunction on just this ground. Omni asserted that the
audiovisual display was not an original work because it was
totally dependent on the underlying computer program. 67 Rather,
the only original work in the game was the computer program, 68
which the plaintiff had not registered. Therefore, the plaintiffs
69
copyright of the audiovisual work was invalid and not infringed.
The district court rejected the defendant's arguments and found
that the audiovisual display was a proper subject for copyright
registration. 7° The court held that the game was an audiovisual
work as defined by the 1976 Act and that the display and program were clearly separable. 71 Many different computer programs
could be written to produce the same displays and many different displays could be produced by varying the program only
slightly.7 2 Thus, registering the program would have provided
the manufacturer little protection against those seeking to trade
on its work. 73 Finding further that the plaintiff would probably
succeed at trial in proving a valid copyright, the court entered
74
the preliminary injunction.
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the injunction, dismissing the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs copyright was
invalid.7 5 The court noted that while the plaintiff might have
received some protection by registering its computer program
with the Copyright Office, this would not have prevented a competitor from producing the same game, thereby cutting into the
plaintiffs profits. 76 Moreover, the court found that the sights

66. See, e.g., Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Eisner Co., 482 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(the court held that plaintiffs copyright registration was invalid for failure to advise the
Copyright Office of facts which may have resulted in rejection of the application and,
therefore, was incapable of supporting an infringement action).
17 U.S.C. § 411 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) states that a registration is a prerequisite for
bringing an action of infringement. Thus, the plaintiff must have one element of its
prima facie case to simply bring the case.
67. 523 F. Supp. at 638; 669 F.2d at 855.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 523 F. Supp. at 638.
71. Id. at 639.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 669 F.2d at 855-56.
76. Id. at 855.
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and sounds of the game were sufficiently original to be copyrighted. 77 The court stated that simply because the production of
the computer program preceded the production of the audiovisual display, which was fixed in the printed circuit boards, the
validity of the copyright was not defeated. 78 The originality
required by the statute occurred at the initial conception of how
the audiovisual display would appear and how it would sound.
The work could be fixed in any medium, even if use of a machine
9
to perceive the work was required?7
The second issue presented by Omni on appeal was that
because the game's audiovisual display is responsive to and varies with the input of the game's players, the work is not fixed in
a tangible medium of expression as required by the 1976 Act.8 0 In
addressing this issue, the Second Circuit cited the district court
8 1 which
opinion in Midway ManufacturingCo. v. Dirkschneider,
held that the audiovisual displays of a video game were fixed in
a tangible form.82 The court in Stern noted that were there no
participation by the players of the game, there could be no question that the game met the fixation requirement of the copyright

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) No. 81-0-43, at 417 (D. Neb. 1981).
82. The defendants in Midway Mfg. had argued that the audiovisual displays of video
games were not fixed in a tangible form of expression and, therefore, were not entitled to
copyright protection. They contended that the images and sounds were merely ephemeral
projections. The court in Midway Mfg. began its analysis by stating that, as audiovisual
works, the games were proper subjects for copyright protection. Id. at 426. The court
noted that § 101 of the 1976 Act defines audiovisual works as "works that consist of a
series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of
machines or devised such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with
accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
films or tapes, in which the works are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Because the subject matter of the plaintiffs copyrights was the games' visual displays
and accompanying sound effects and because the games' visual displays were a series of
related images "intrinsically intended to be projected on a cathode ray tube by means of
electronic equipment," the court found the works to be copyrightable audiovisual works.
214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 426.
Next the court examined the Act's fixation requirement. A work is fixed for copyright
purposes as long as it is perceptible for more than a momentary period. Id. at 427. The
court found that the plaintiffs audiovisual work was not transitory because the circuit
boards (ROMs) which contained all possible game movements and which controlled the
display did not vary; their existence was permanent. Id. The image fixed therein would
recur given the proper sequence of play. Thus, the court held that the fixation requirement of the 1976 Act had been met. Id.
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statute.83 The audiovisual work is permanently embodied in
memory devices (ROMs) and becomes perceptible when connected to other electronic components in the machine.8 4 The
court also held, however, that participation of the player of the
game does not negate the work's copyright protection. 5 Despite
the variance of sights and sounds resulting from the player's
actions, much of the game's appearance and sequence of play
remains constant no matter who is at the controls.8 6 The characters on the screen always look the same, and the sounds heard whenever a player moves or causes a particular action to occur are
always the same.8 7 Also, the sequence in which certain displays
appear is always the same, even though an unskilled player may
never see every possible display.8 8 As the court noted, the images
and sounds remain fixed, and although the player can vary the
movement of the images, he can never produce a display which
was not initially fixed in the memory devices.8 9 Thus, the work
met the fixation requirements of section 102(a) of the Act. 90
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics,Corp.
At about the same time that the Second Circuit was addressing the copyrightability of video games, the Seventh Circuit was
considering the proper scope of such protection. In Atari, Inc. v.
North American Philips ConsumerElectronics Corp.,9 1 the plaintiff, Atari, owned the exclusive right to market the home version
of the PAC-MAN video game; the plaintiff, Midway Manufacturing Co., owned the exclusive right to market the coin-operated
arcade version of the game. Atari and Midway alleged that the
defendant's K.C. MUNCHKIN game was substantially similar
to PAC-MAN and moved for a preliminary injunction. 92 The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion and they appealed.

83. 669 F.2d at 855.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 856.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir. 1982). This issue was specifically reserved by the court
in Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982).
92. 672 F.2d at 610.
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Because the parties had stipulated to the validity of the plaintiffs' copyright,9 3 the only issue before the court of appeals was
whether the second part of the prima facie case of copyright
infringement had been met: were the two works substantially
similar. 94 The court stated that works are substantially similar if
"an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiffs protectible expression
by taking material of substance and value." 9 5 Infringement
occurs only if the artistic expression, the protectible expression,
of two works is substantially similar. Similarity of the underlying idea is allowed. 96
In Atari, the Seventh Circuit began its application of this rule
by considering the elements of the two games, including the
appearance and movement of the characters, the sounds made
and the basic play of the games. 9 7 The court then applied the
abstractions test to determine which elements of plaintiffs' PACMAN game were protected by the copyright. 98
As described by the court, PAC-MAN ia a maze-chase game, in
which a player scores points by guiding the central character
through a maze while it is being pursued by various opponent
characters. The player attempts to avoid these opponents and on
occasion succeeds in capturing one. The capture of an opponent
occurs when it temporarily becomes vulnerable to the central
character. Points are scored when the opponents are overtaken
and when the central character completes the maze. 9 9 These
elements were held unprotectible. Because they constituted an
expression of the game "idea," anyone could use them without
infringing the copyright.1 0 0
The court then turned to those game elements which it termed
"scenes a faire,"10 1 that is, standard game devices only capable

93. Id. at 614.
94. Id. A prima facie case of copyright infringement requires that the plaintiff show
ownership of a valid copyright and copying by the defendant. See also supra notes 64-66
and accompanying text.
95. 672 F.2d at 614.
96. Id. at 615. See also supratext accompanying notes 36-42.
97. 672 F.2d at 610-13.
98. Id. at 617. See also supranotes 49-51 and accompanying text.
99. 672 F.2d at 617.
100. Id. See also supra note 40 and text accompanying notes 38-41.
101. 672 F.2d at 617. Scenes a faire was an approach to the idea/expression dichotomy
used by courts in a literary context. It referred to stock literary devices which, as a practi-
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of expression in a limited number of ways. 0 2 The idea and the
expression of the idea of such elements are nearly synonymous.
Thus, they are only entitled to protection from virtual or identical copying of the copyrighted version."' :' In the PAC-MAN
work, the outline of the maze, the scoring table, the tunnel exits
(which allow the central figure to escape capture by exiting one
side of the maze and then reappear on the opposite side), and the
dots for scoring were all scenes a faire elements entitled to this
limited protection. 10 4 Corresponding parts of the defendant's
K.C. MUNCHKIN game, however, did not exactly duplicate
these elements of the PAC-MAN game, and therefore no infringement of these elements was found.
The court also evaluated the respective characters used by
K.C. MUNCHKIN and PAC-MAN, and based upon the similarity in their appearances, found infringement.1 0'5 As the court
noted, maze-chase games can be expressed in many forms and
6
Atari had created particular characters for its PAC-MAN game. 10
The defendant had substantially imitated the plaintiffs' game in
the shape and features of its figures, in the process by which its
opponent becomes vulnerable, and in sounds accompanying
play. 10 7 Although there were slight differences between the
defendant's and plaintiffs' games, the court held that the defendant was infringing the plaintiffs' copyrights and directed the
district court to enter a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
defendant from further infringement. 10 8 In so holding, the court
stated that the defendant's reliance on the differences between
the games served only to highlight how much of the plaintiffs'
game the defendant had deliberately copied. 10 9 Thus, even though
all elements were not duplicated, the overall similarity of the
games led to a finding of infringement.

cal matter, were indispensable in the treatment of certain topics. Thus, scenes a faire
elements were only protected from virtually identical copying. Id. See also Alexander v.
Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
102. 672 F.2d at 617.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 619.
106. Id. at 617.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 618.
109. Id.
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ANALYSIS

In seeking to provide protection to new and ever-increasing
types of media and forms of expression, the 1976 Act did not set
forth a list of protected items as the 1909 Act had done."10 Rather,
the 1976 Act provided protection for works which are original,
fixed in a tangible medium, and more than a mere idea."' The
decisions in Stern and Atari suggest that the 1976 Act is sufficiently broad to protect new and developing media of artistic
expression.
Originality
In Stern,' 12 the court recognized that video games are an artistic expression entitled to full copyright protection. 13 The manufacturers of audiovisual games operate in a somewhat unusual
and highly competitive market. 1 4 Although the profitable life of
an audiovisual game is extremely limited, the costs of creating,
developing and manufacturing a video game are quite substantial. 115 The person who copies a successful video game is saved
the high costs of development while being able to reap a high
rate of return in a short time."16 Any distribution activity by a
copier, therefore, will greatly cut into the copyright owner's profit
potential. 17 Consequently, without the assurance that its work
will be protected by a copyright, the original manufacturer will
have no incentive to invest time, effort and money into the creation and manufacture of new video games. The public will suffer
because new games will not be brought into the market, and this
new medium of expression developed for the entertainment of
the public would in all likelihood stagnate. Such a result would
not coincide with the economic philosophy expressed by the
18
Constitution's copyright clause.'
As recognized by the court in Stern, because more than one
computer program can be used to achieve the same result, the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See
See
669
See
See

supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
Stern Elec. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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end product of a computer program is not fully protected from
copying by others simply by registering the program with the
Copyright Office. 11 9 This fact is particularly important to manufacturers of audiovisual games. The end product of the computer
programs written for audiovisual games is the display seen and
the sounds heard by the game's player. It is these elements that
make a game a public success and that must, therefore, be protected.1 20 Understandably, the plaintiffs in Stern obtained an
audiovisual copyright, rather than a program copyright, so that
the distinctive shapes, sounds and movements of the characters
they had created would be protected.
The technology of the video game does require that a computer
program be written before the audiovisual work can be seen by
the public.121 The program is translated into a machine-readable
object code and transferred to the printed circuit boards or
ROMs. The ROMs are then connected to the electronics of the
video game machine. This additional step did not detract from
the court's finding of originality of the work in Stern, however,
nor should it have. It was merely the author's choice of media.
The constitutional objective to foster creativity was best served
by the decision of the Second Circuit and by the rationale of that
opinion.
Fixation in a Tangible Form
In addition, the economic philosophy underlying the copyright
clause suggests that the public benefit derived from works that
are simply ephemeral projections would be slight. Little would be
gained by granting a monopoly in such instances where the
work is not captured, since there would be little to exploit.

119. 669 F.2d at 855. See supra text accompanying note 76.
120. 669 F.2d at 855.
121. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. Ill.
1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980): "A computer program has
been defined generally as a set of precise instructions that tells the computer how to solve
a problem."
The computer program is then transferred to the game's circuit boards. In its findings
of fact, the court in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider,214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 421-22,
explained the mechanical composition of video games as follows:
The audiovisual games involved here consist of a cabinet containing electronic
circuitry and a television picture tube which serves as a screen upon which the
visual images of the game are shown. The electronic circuitry is in the form of
printed circuit boards and other electronic components which cause the images
of each game to be seen on the screen and generate the sounds of each game.
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The focus of the argument that the fixation requirement was
not met in the video game cases was that the sounds and images
22
of the audiovisual display varied with each individual player.
Because the player controlled the display, it was argued, the
audiovisual work was merely a succession of images of only
momentary duration created by each game player. 123 The analysis followed by the district court in Dirkschneider, however,
124
illuminates the fundamental flaw in this argument.
As the Dirkschneider court noted, section 102(a) provides a
definition of fixation which differs from that of court decisions
preceding the 1976 Act.' 25 The new definition is very flexible; it
contains no limitation on the type of material object an author
may choose for the fixation of his work.1 26 Further, the statute
specifically provides that authors may use forms or media not
yet known at the time the statute was drafted.' 27 The only statutory restriction is that the form be sufficiently stable so as to
28
permit perception of the work for more than a mere moment.
The audio and visual display of a video game is entirely contained in the ROMs, which control the display so that a specific
scene or sound will be effected in response to the player's input.
The movement of the characters can be controlled by the game
player only if the ROMs contain instructions permitting such
movements. 29 The audiovisual works registered by the plaintiffs in Stern, Atari, and Dirkschneider are fixed in such ROMs
and are perceptible when the circuit boards are connected to the
electronics of the video game machine. This process conforms
with the definition of fixation contained in section 102(a).
A second provision of the 1976 Act also refutes the fixation

The printed circuit board for each game is loaded with electronic components.
These components include computer chips, called ROMs, PROMs and EPROMs
by those in the trade. The PROMs store the information which produces the
games' images and sounds. This information includes the field on which the
game is played, the design of the playing symbols or images seen on the screen,
their interactions with one another, and the accompanying musical and sound
effects. (footnote omitted).
122.

See supra text accompanying notes 80, 82.

12:3.

Id.

124.
125.

See supra note 82.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.

126.
127.

See supra notes 28-29.
See supra note 29.

128.
129.

See supra note 28.
See supra notes 82, 121.
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argument made by the defendants. The Act specifically provides
that an audiovisual work is performed when its images are
shown to the public, in any sequence. 130 Therefore, the validity
of an audiovisual copyright is not affected merely because it may
not appear in the same sequence each time it is performed. The
work is complete and fixed in the printed circuit boards, and the
player can exert only limited control over the sequence in which
the work is displayed.
The plaintiffs in Stern and Atari created audiovisual works
which were displayed not through traditional media, such as
film or videotape, but through a new medium, printed circuit
boards. Because this medium was chosen, plaintiffs' works had a
unique characteristic. The viewer of the work could become a
participant and to an extent control the movement of the characters. The player's skill determined just how long the display was
seen and how many different movements and sequences challenged him before play ended. However, all the possible movements as well as the characters were created by the plaintiffs
and fixed in the ROMs, just as all of a director's work is captured
on film. The form in which the work is fixed, which may or may
not admit of added dimensions, should not control the copyrightability issue. The Stern and Dirkschneider decisions to this
effect furthered the objectives of the Constitution and the copyright statute.
An Idea Is Not Copyrightable
Once a work is found to meet the threshold requirements for
copyright protection of originality and fixation in a tangible
form, the more difficult question must be faced, namely, what
elements of the work will be accorded copyright protection and
how extensive will that protection be. Some elements may be
entitled to broad protection, while others will be protected only
against exact duplication by others.1 3' This is a crucial determination for the copyright owner. Although the validity of the
copyright registration may be upheld, the copyright may be
meaningless if the court holds that the work is entitled to a very

130. To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly
or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it
audible. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
131. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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limited scope of protection.

2
The copyright statute states that an idea is not protectible."
The legislative history of the 1976 Act indicates that it was the
intention of the drafters to neither increase nor decrease the
scope of copyright protection, as understood under prior case
law.' : ' Section 102(b) appears to be an affirmation that the
idea/expression dichotomy developed by the courts is still viable
under the new Act. The relevant case law, however, has offered
no clear guidance, by way of a general principle, to assist courts
in drawing the line between copying an idea and copying its
expression.3 4 Indeed, it has been noted that the terms "idea"
and "expression" are no more than labels for a result reached
35
and not a tool for analyzing a problem.
The issue confronted by the Seventh Circuit in Atari was simplified by the fact that the subject matter under review was a
game. Unlike a book or short story, the idea underlying a game
is relatively easy to isolate. The manner or method of play of a
game, which can often be determined by reading the rules of the
game, is not protectible. Rather, it is the particular design and
ornamentation which an author or manufacturer brings to his
version of the game that constitute the protectible elements of a
36
game under the 1976 Act.'
The Seventh Circuit prohibited any monopolization of the elements of the PAC-MAN game which were necessary to play of
the game. 3 7 Further, it afforded a strictly limited scope of protection to those game elements which embodied some artistry
but were incapable of being expressed in many different ways
given the function they served.1 38 Finally, those parts of the
game which were highly creative and capable of much variation
without affecting the play of the game, were given a broad scope
of protection. 39 Although a decision in this area necessarily
involves some subjectivity, the Seventh Circuit's approach to
this issue was very sound. It guarantees competitors the opportunity to use a successful game idea, while affording the copy-
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right owner sufficient protection to ensure that his incentive to
develop new games is maintained. The public benefits because
manufacturers of games are prohibited from copying all elements of what has proven to be a successful game. Competitors
must rely on their own creative energies to develop new ways of
presenting a game idea to the public. Although competitors are
free to adopt the same premise as the established game, they
must each build on the idea differently. The creative effort and
expenditure of money required to develop the work is what the
copyright protects. Thus, the decision of the Seventh Circuit fosters competition and ensures that creative development will not
stagnate.
CONCLUSION

The Second and Seventh Circuit decisions demonstrate that
new technologies used as media for artistic expression are protectible under the 1976 Copyright Act. More importantly, the
rationale outlined by these decisions shows that the Act is sufficiently flexible to support the holdings of the courts. Thus, artists
will be protected even though they use media not in existence at
the time the Act was written. Finally, the Act and the decisions
interpreting the Act further the constitutional interests of both
the individual artist and the public under the copyright clause.
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